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Summary 
The development of domestic industries is vital to improve the agricultural productivity of any na-
tion. The dev巴lopmentof domestic industries is， however， largely dep巴ndentupon the economic， techno-
logical， institutional and socio-cultural endowments of the given nation. Although the importance of the 
first three factors for industrialization has been extensively studied， the later has seldom been supported 
with empirical research. Therefore， this study attempts to investigate the socio-cultural impact on indus-
trialization of three nations; a less industrializ巴dcountry (Sri L朋 ka)，a n巴wlyindustrialized country (Re-
public of Korea)， and a highly industrialized country (Japan). In this respect， six m句orsocio-cultural eル
dowments， namely socio-economic structure， social organization， education， mass communication， fertil-
ity rate， and cultural homogeneity & social tension of the three nations were analyzed and compared to 
乱scertaintheir impact on th巴developmentof domestic industries. This research is mainly based on secon-
dary data from the recent publications of th巴WorldBank， UNDP， FAO， ADB， and country studies. In aふ
dition， some country experts were interviewed where judgmental information was rl叫uired.
The intef叩countrycomparison showed a significant variation in the socio-cultural endowments of the 
three nations. The socio-cultural charact巴risticssuch as the size of th巴agriculturalsector， extent of Uf-
banization， gender inequality， orientation towards science and technology巴ducation，mass communica-
tion， and most of al， the cultural het巴rogeneityand related violence， which have both direct and indirect 
influences on the industrialization process， were significantly different among the three nations. The im-
pact of these socio即culturalvariations was also straightforward. There were marked differences in the in-
dustrial and agricultural growth and productivity， and consequently on the economic development of the 
said nations. Th巴refore，there is an urg巴ntneed to re-construct the socio-cultural巴ndowmentsof Sri 
Lanka， ifit wishes to foster faster development of its industrial and agricultural sectors組 dcons叫uently
to achieve巴conomicprogress. 
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Iniroduction 
Domestic industries have played a vital role in development， especially during the transi-
tional period from a predominant agricultural economy to an industrial economy. Domestic in回
dustries creat巴largermarkets and higher prices for agricultural products， stimulating the activities 
of both sectors. The absorption of surplus agricultural labor as well as the supply of t巴chnical
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inputs and technologies through research and development by th巴industrialsector act as m勾or
means of enhancing productivity of the agricultural sector. This relationship has m司jorimpor司
tance for d巴velopingcountries like Sri Lanka， wher巴75percent of the population stilllives in印刷
ral areas d巴pendingon agriculture related activities for their livelihood (C巴ntralBank， 1998). 
Historically， Sri Lankans have had great feats in industrial arts that th巴ycan stil b巴proudof. 
The dry zone civilization (200 BC-AD 1200Y of Sri Lanka was famous for its technological inno凶
vations， especially in irrigation巴ngineering.During that period， technologies and the irrigation 
network formed the basis for a thriving economy with a large agricultural surplus. Unfortunately， 
those technologies were lost in the collapse of th巴civilizationdue to reasons that are stil not well 
defined. Then， up to the colonial period， Sri Lanka was characterized by rath巴rmediocre rat巴sof 
both industrial and agricultural development. During this period， industries w巴r巴 stigmatizedby 
attaching them to various socio-cultural institutions including the caste system. Some believ巴it
was due to the poor leadership and the absence of a poweliul king to rule the country. 
Modern industries began to enter the island along with the巴xpansionof European presence 
from around 1505， but th巴ywere merely in ext.ractive and plantation sectors. From a quiet colo-
nial background， Sri Lankans began to thrust into the 'modern' world through technological revo“ 
lution2 from the late 1940's， with early steps towards de-colonization and political independence. 
However， the path towards a higher degr巴巴 ofindustrialization was mainly through technological 
imports and aid， with minimal attention given to the development of its domestic industrial sector. 
Efforts to develop domestic industries through the two broad policy approaches adopted in the 
postcolonial era， the Import Substitution Industrialization (1957-1977) and Export Oriented ln-
dustrialization (from 1978)， have met with litle success. As a result， today Sri Lanka shows one 
of the lowest rates of industrial and agricultural development in Asia and its standards are far be-
low that of the Asian NIEs. 
The developm巴ntof industries is largely dependent upon the socio司culturalendowments of a 
given nation， apart from the巴conomic，technological， and institutional factors. In neoclassical 
economics， many analysts have attempt巴dto explain industrial and economic progress from their 
socio同culturalperspectiv巴s，although they carry litl巴empiricalcontent (日oselitz，1952; Higgins; 
1959; Adelman and Morris， 1971; Hayami and Ruttan， 1991). For instanceラ theimportanc巴of
these socio-cultural aspects has been manifest巴din Sombart's‘Spirit of Capitalism'， Tawney's 
'Protestant Work Ethics'， aswell as Japan's unprecedented economic succ巴sin the post World 
War n periocJ. and th巴recentdevelopment of the Asian NIEs. In these exampl巴s，th巴development
of the nations has been attributed to their socio嶋culturalendowments that have consistently fa-
vored the domestic industrialization process. Nevertheless， these relationships between socio-
cultural endowments and developmene of a nation have seldom been supported wIth empiricallーか
search. 
1 The ancient civilization of Sri Lanka巴mergedand flourished in the island's dry zone， mainly in the northern 
pJain region with capitals at Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa 
2 For example， commissioning of Laxapana station (1950) to generat巴hydropower，seting up of Six Year De-
velopment Plan (1951-1957) and Six Year Programme ofInvestment (1954-1959) to develop agricuJtural inu'a-
structure and privat巴sectorindustries， etc. (Central Bank of Sri Lanka， 1998: 13) 
3 Hereaft巴r，in this stndy developm巴ntis ref，巴汀巴dto as the grow出inthe productivity of industrial and agricul-
tural s巴ctorsof a country. 
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Therefore， this study attempts to analyze and compare the socio-cultural impact on the in-
dustrialization proc巴sof three nations namely; a less industrialized country (Sri Lanka)， a newly 
indus住ializedcountry同 NIE(Republic of Korea)， and a highly industrialized country (Japan). The 
study hypothesizes that a sound industrialization process requires the nations to possess socio四
cultura14 endowments that facilitate individual behavior and institutional processes toward change， 
adapt， and dev巴lop.Six major socioべ;ulturalvariables namely socio悶economicst叩 cture，social 
organization，巴ducation，mass communication， fertility rate， and cultural homogeneity & social 
tension of the three nations were analyzed to ascertain their impact on the development of domes-
tic industri巴s.The research is mainly based on secondatγdata from the recent publications of the 
World Bank， UNDP， FAO， ADB， and country studies. In situations where subjective information 
was required， some interviews were carried out with the respective country experts. 
An Overview of Socio勾culturalEndowm配ntsAffeciing Industrialization 
i) Socio-economic Sh・ucture:
In the proc田 sof industrializatio凡 am付orpopulation movement企oma tradit悶 lalsubsis四
tent agricultural sector to an urban industrial sector can be observed. This transition leads to the 
reduction of the sectoral， geographicラandtechnological cleavage between a traditional subsistent 
sector and a modern commercial sector. In addition， italso leads to a reduction of poverty and the 
disparity of income between rich and poor. In order to analyze these transformations， four indica-
tors were employed namely， the size of the agricultural sector， extent of urbanization， extent of 
dualismラandthe extent of poverty and income disparity. 
Size of agricultural sector: In historical studies， ithas been proven that with industrializa-
tion， the size of the agricultural sector declines. The agricultural sector should release la輸
bor required for industrial expansion. Cons巴quently，it helps to improv巴agriculturalpro-
ductivity， by disposing surplus labor in the agricultural sector， which is believed to have a 
zero marginal product (Arthur Lewis， 1954). 
Extent of urbαnization: The cIties provide a concentration of popul以ionfrom which in町
dustrial labor c組 bedrawn and they also contain a greater variety of skills and resources 
th組 dorural areぉ.Thus， industrialization r叫U1resa c側 aindegree of urbanization. 
Extent of dualism: Dualism is referred to as 'a marked contrast in social organization， cul-
tural style， and technologies between the traditional subsist巴nceand modern commercial 
sectors'. The extent of dualism declinεs with industrialization. During th巴earlystages of 
industrialization， th巴subsistenceagriculture sector helps the modern commercial sector to 
develop through providing its surplus labor. Then， the benefits cr巴atedby the commercial 
sector will eventually trickle down to traditional sectors， thus the extent of dualism de-
clines. In less industrializ巴dnations， a predominant traditional sector exists side by side 
with an insignificant modern sector with limited interaction between them. 
Extent of poverty and income dispariη: Nations characterized by extreme poverty find it 
difficult to allocate sufficient funds for industrial activ福田.These countries spend most of 
4 Accepting the manifold problems with the d巴finitionof culture， this study defines culture as 'the acquired and 
shared values and norms that people use to int巴rpret巴xperienceand generat巴socialbehavior' 
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their income for food and other necessities rather than for investment goods. Another 
characteristic of less industrializ巴dnations is high income disparity between rich and poor 
that has worsen the poverty level of m勾orityof the population. Industrial productivity suf-
fers due to a labor force that cannot ev巴nsatisfy its basic needs， including food and shelt巴r.
i) Social Organization: 
The long run industrial development has almost invariably b巴enaccompanied by significant 
transformation in the pattern of social organization， including kinship， gender， and class relation-
ships. Four indicators were employed in analyzing the social organization of the three nations 
namely; kinship relationships， gende1' inequality， indigenous middle class， and social mobility. 
同 Kinshiprelationships: Historically， indust1'ialization is associated with transformation 
from a traditional society with tribal， clan， orextended family units into a modern society 
in which the dominant kinship unit is a nuc1ear farnily. In an色xtendedfamily， the fruits of 
special individual efforts are distributed among the group 01' community. This tends to di-
rninish incentives for individuals to perform riskψtaking activities and thus has an adverse 
effect upon investment. In contrast， the small nuclear family system facilitates the linking 
of pe1'sonal efforts to rewards. In nuclear farnilies， individual performance is evaluat巴don 
th巴basisof merit rathe1' than status， asin the extended farnilies. 
Gender inequality: Societi巴sin the less industrialized nations tend to be male dorninated， 
with a strong division of labor by sex and a t巴ndencyto stigmatize f，巴maleroles. Women 
are not perrnitted to engage in economic roles and traditionally a family loses status if 
women ar巴permittedto engage in extra-domestic economic roles. In these societies， only 
a tiny minority of women receiv巴san advanced education. Women generally assume that 
active social participation and decision making is a male pr古 ogative.However， ithas be巴n
proved that industrial advancement is easier if women are free to make the most of their 
abilities (Hunt， 1966: 407-417) 
ー Indigenousmiddle class: An aspect of social organization commonly associated with in-
dustrialization is the availability of a pool of commercial， entrepreneurial， professional， 
and technical talents (i.e. a middle clas). Historically， inthe econornic development of 
Western Europe， the rniddle class was a driving force in the growth of business ent巴rprise.
In les industrialized countries， however， indigenous middle class is either small in pro耐
portion or has less opportunities to provid巴theleadership for economic change. Further-
more， toan even greater extent， a larger part of the available talents important for indus凹
trial activities is often found among expatriate groups in the population that char旦cteristi四
cally tend to concentrate their efforts within the existing modern sectors. 
町 Socialmobility: A positive association between social mobility and industrialization has 
often be巴nemphasized. Less industrialized nations have relatively rigid patterns of social 
stratification and social values. The social values associated with family， ethnicity， caste 
and class structures form a banier to individua1 initiatives and巴conomicachievements. 
Social mobility is determined by attitudes towards the extent of opportunity for an indi四
vidual to advanc巴bymeans of ability rather than social status. A significant aspect of so噌
cial mobility is the extent of opportunity in a society to obtain skils and education. 
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In巴vitably，a narr・oweducational base limits th巴scopefor individual improvement in status. 
The expansion of industry normally entrains an increase in op抑制凶iesto advance into 
middle class occupations. However， the presence or absence of prohibitive cultural barrト
ers (e.g.巴thnic，caste， etc.) will govem this upward social movement. 
誌1i)Education: 
Education has a role in the social development of a nation， which determines its rate of in-
dustrialization. Literacy is an economic asset in industrial urban occupations facilitating the train-
ing of unskilled as well as skilled workers. Literacy is the basic personal skil underlying the 
whole process of modemization. However， industrialized nations hav巴gonefar beyond achieving 
mere lit巴racyand have emphasized science and technology education at secondary and tertiary 
levels. At the same time， these nations have provided adequate opportunities to its intellectually 
talented people， inorder to get their maximum potentials for national development efforts. For 
education， therefore， three indicators were employed， namely; primary & adult literacy rate， sci-
ence & technology巴ducation，and graduat，巴employment.
Primaη) education and adult literacy: While less industrialized countries stress the impor附
tance of primary education and its key product， literacy， inindustrialized countries a con開
sid巴rableweight is given to expansions in secondary and tertiary education as a source of 
the rise in aggregate productivity. 
Science and technology education: Les industrialized nations are desperately short of 
specialists， which require advanced educational preparation. In most of these less industri-
alized countries， school and university curriculums are aimed at imparting a sound classi-
cal and liberal arts education. The provision of scientific and technical knowledg巴， and 
therefore the manpower・inthese areas is in short supply. 
Graduate employment: Less industrialized countries are paradoxically characterized by a 
considerable number of unemployed university graduates and at th巴sametime， are short 
of various types of skilled manpower. Their universities have failed to create functionally 
literate graduates who have the right knowledge， skills， and attitudes needed by contem-
porary industries. 
iv) Mass Communication: 
Modern media systems are an important mechanism for diffusing modem thought patterns， 
increasing demand for industrial products， and for inducing greater participation in national po-
litical systems. Clos巴relationshipsbetween the evolution of mass media and other indicators of 
urbanization and industrialization are underlined by statistical analyses. A positive association has 
been found between daily newspaper circulation per 1000 population and employment in industry 
as a percentage of working age population; per capita GNP; adult literacy rate; and urbanization 
(Russett， etα1.， 1964). In industrialized nations， both the amount and the quality of information 
presented in the mass media ar巴comparativelyhigher than that of less industrializ巴dnations. 
v) FertiUかRate:
Decline in the rate of fertility is a result of a complex of interrelated institutional and socio-
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cultural changes， which accompany the process of industrialization and urbanization. The spread 
of the market and the concomitant improvement in opportunities for geographic and occupational 
mobility， tend to creat巴economicadvantages for smaller families. 1n an urban setting， incontrast 
to rural areas， having a large number of children becomes more of a direct burden than且benefit.
Too many family obligations， including feeding， clothing and educating children， restrict people 
from investm巴ntactivities. The attitudinal changes associated with industrialization and urbaniza-
tion， inparticular the application of rational thought pattems to everyday d巴cisions，t，巴ndto gen巴r四
ate preferences for a lower farnily size. Therefore， inindustrialized nations the rat巴offeltility or 
the number of children per farnily tends to be lower than that of a less industrialized country. 
vi) Cultural Homogenei，砂andSocial時nsion:
A familiar characteristic of many less industrialized countries is the presence of diversity in 
socio同culturalinstitutions including ethnicity， religion， class， language， and caste. Consequently， 
these countries are characterized by a continuous presence of巴xtremeand widespread social ten-
sions that relate to these socio蜘culturalinstitutions. 
Cultural homogeneity: Among countries at the巴arli巴ststage of social and economic de-
velopment， the“primordial attachments" of rac巴， religion， class， language， and c且stetend 
to be very strong. The antagonistic perceptions derived from such primordial attachments 
have resulted in a lack of social and economic integration that contribut巴totheir difficul同
ties in initiating a process of industrialization. In addition， these primordial attachments 
characteristically come into sever conflict with th巴requirementsfor effective social inte-
gration and， inparticular， with the need for more generalized commitments to a relatively 
impersonal nation-wide civil order. In general， itseem reasonable to conclude that， other 
things being equal， relatively homogeneous societies with respect to cultural charactelis-
tics ar巴lesshampered in th巴achievementof social and political integration and in the in-
Itiation of continuous industrialization and economic growth than more heterogeneous so-
cletles. 
自 Socialtension: Th巴r巴arecontrasting views on the relationship between social tension and 
economic development. Some believe that the strains and conflicts of change can become 
important mechanisms for inducing further economic and social transformations. In in-
dustrializ巴dnations， the frequ巴ntoccurr・enceof serious social tension and social conflict 
in th吋 earlystages of industrialization， urbanization， and modemization has often been 
noted. In the first place， the breakup of the traditional kinship and tribal groups that are 
characteristic of low-income countries produce tensions， both personal and social. A num拘
ber of sociologists view social disturbances and outbreaks as often being intimately re四
lated to the proc巴ssesof differentiation of socio-economic structure and of its subsequent 
reint巴gration.According to th巴seviews， one would exp巴cta positive association， atleast 
in the short-run， between social tension叩 drapid economic growth. 
However， itis self.剛evidentthat at al stages of socio刷出onomic巴volutionthe contin-
ued presence of extreme social tension， accompanied by widespread and violent outbreaks， 
inevitably hampers industrial developm巴ntbecause of their adverse effect on risk-taking 
activities and thereby inv巴stm巴nt.Thus， one would anticipate a long凶runpositive 
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relationship betw巴巴nbetter industrial growth and the absence of extreme and widespread 
social tensions. 
Socio悶culturalVariations A拙 ongthe Three Nations: 
In this study， emphasis will be given to discuss Sri Lankan socio制culturalendowments com-
pared to the other two nations. The socio網culturalindicators of Republic of Korea and Japan are 
pr巴sentedonly as a guide and to understand how industrialized countries are oriented towards 
their industrialization process. Thus， the scope of this study is limited to examining how the six 
socio-cultural endowments have been created and maintained in Sri Lanka but not o explain each 
and every variable in al three nations. 
In order to understand these six socio四culturalendowments and their indicators， asmany 
variables as possible (both quantitative and qualitative) were analyzed and compared. For in欄
stance， 12 different v訂iableswere used to understand the concept of gender inequality among the 
three nations. The comparison of quantitative data is not an issu巴asclear numerical values are al-
ready available. However， inorder to compare the three nationsラ qualitative(judgmental) vari皿
ables， such characteristics were first specified in numerical terms. It is obvious， of course， that the 
choice of a numerical scale for qualitative indicators is arbitrary. The scale we chose was a simple 
lin巴arone， which ranged from 1 to 4. We assigned a score of 4 for the characteristics that were 
most favorable fo1' industrialization， and a scor，巴 of1 for characteristics that were least favorable 
or unfavorable for industrialization. When th巴characteristicslie in betwe巴nor the difference was 
not clear酬cut，a score of 0.5 was added to the original score. 
'i) Socio開economicStructure: 
As in Table 1， inSri Lanka， compared to the other two countries， a large proportion of its 
population live in relatively self-contain巴dagricultural communities in which production is pri-
ma1'ily for local consumption5• These communities cultivat巴theirland using traditional techniques 
of production， which are largely determined by inherited social values and organization. This has 
resulted in a lack of agricultural surplus to be sold in the market， thus a low income for the farm 
families. ln order to increase agricultural p1'oductivity， this sector should release labor to industry 
for its expansion. However， the low income of the farm families does not allow them to educate 
their children who will continue to depend on farming for thei1' livelihood and cons巴qu巴ntlyfur-
ther reduce productivity and farm income due to the f1'agmentation of land， which will continue 
as a viscous cycle. 
The importance of expanding agricultural output lies partly in the need to provid巴inc1'eased
food supplies to growing urban areas. Neverthel巴s，the expansion rate of urban a1'eas in Sri 
Lanka is one of the lowest in the world. Only about one quarter of the population lives in the cit-
ies of Sri Lanka， while it is th巴oppositein Rep. of Korea and Japan where more than three 
quarters of the population live in the cities. The industries set up in the cities thus face di伍culti巴S
5 According to the Dept. of Census and Statistics of Sri Lanka (source: http://www.statistics.gov.lk/abstract/Ja目
bour/tab 0402.pdf)， the percentage of labor force in agriculture in the year 2000 was only 36 p巴rcent.I-lowever， 
in order to maintain the consistency of the data and the source the authors relied on the World Bank data. 
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Table 1: Comparison of Socio-economic Structure of the Three Nations 
Socio-economic Structure Sri Lanka Rep.of Japan Korea 
Size of Agricultural Sector 
ーLaborforce in agriculture (% of total) 2000 45.5 10.0 4.1 
Extent of Urbanization 
-Urban population (% of total) 2001 23.1 82.4 78.9 
-Annual growtb rate ofurban population 1995-2000 2.3 2.0 
Ext巴ntof Dualism 
制 Extentof sectoral and geographic cleavage between tradト
2‘S 3.5 4.0 tional/subsistence and modern/commercial sectors ' 
国 Extentof utilization of modern technology between tradi-
2幽5 3.5 4.0 tional and modern sectors" 
Poverty and Income Disparity 
ーPopulationbelow US$ 2 a day (%) 1990-2001 45.4 く2.0
-Gini index 34.4 (1995) 31.6 (1993) 24.9 (1993) 
-Distribution of income or consumption (% share) 
Lowest20% 8.0 7.5 10.6 
Highest20% 42.8 39.3 35.7 
Note: 
， 1.No cleavage (Iimited development of modern sector) 2. A sharp and pervasive cleavage (ove附 helmingpredomi-
nance of traditional sector) 3. A moderately definite cleavage (an important modern sector)4. No clear-cut cleavage (high 
level of interaction between traditional and modern sectors) 
" 1.No modern technology 2. Moderate technology in commercial sector 3. Moderate to advanced technology in commer-
cial sector with a pr自dominanttraditional sector with moderate technology 4. Advanced technology in both sectors 
Sourιe: The World Bank， UNDP， FAO， ADB， country studies， and interviews 
in finding both skill巴dand unskilled labor. Having identifi巴dthis limitation， a major move of In-. 
dustries to rural areas was observ巴din the lat巴1980sand the early 1990s. Nevertheless， som巴of
those industries hav巴alreadyfailed and others face immense problems du巴topoor infrastructure 
facilities in the rural areas. Not only labor， but urbanization also promotes valu出 favorableto en耐
trepreneurship and industrial growth. Daniel LemeI・(1958)emphasized that some degree of ur-
banization is necess訂yfor economic and political modemization， substantial extension of educa-
tion， mass communication， etc.， that determine industrialization. 
Another striking characteristic of the socio-econornic structure of Sri Lanka is the existence 
of a modelτ1 commercial sector and a traditional subsistence sector side by sid巴withoutinterac-
tion. The extent of dualism or the sectoral， geographic， and technological cleavage and associated 
socio-cultural diff，巴rencesbetween these two sectors is very wide in Sri Lanka compared to the 
other two countries. Technology in the commercial sector t巴ndsto be modem and sophisticated 
where the limited expansion has been largely the r巴sultof foreign direct investment. 1n the subsis同
tence sector， ittends to be traditional where expansion has taken place through increased popula鴫
tion of the indigenous producers and has shifted into small伊scaleoperations. Dualism is an essen-
tial stage of development as countries proceed from stagnant agrarian economies toward巴co叫
nomic maturity (Lewis， 1954; Fei and Ranis， 1964). Nevertheless， the importance arises when the 
two sectors interact with each other and the benefits of a rapidly growing commercial sector紅e
trickled down to the traditional subsistence sector. Unfortunat巴ly，this relationship has seldom 
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been seen in Sri Lanka， thus the development of domestic small scale industries has shown poor 
growth. 
This side-by-side existence of the dorninant subsistence sector with an insignificant but rap-
idly growing commercial s巴ctorhas caused a great disparity in income distribution and conse-
quently forced the majority of the population into extreme poverty. Tn Sri Lanka， nearly half of 
the population receives les than two dollars per day. Further， th巴highest20 percent of population 
eぽnsand/or consumes about 43 percent of the national income. The mass industrialization of a 
nation， which involves a considerable growth of small domestic industries， will never occur in 
such conditions of extreme poverty and income disparity. 
i) Social Organization: 
Th巴dominantSri Lankan family structure is an extended system， which is organized in a hi愉
erarchical order. This forms a residential aggregate of a three-generation kin group of both sexes. 
Thes巴extendedfarnilies form into a larger kin group known as 'pavula'， an endogamous and cor-
porate bilateral kin group that represents a union of several families. On closer inspection， one 
may find various connections betwe巴nextended family and industries. Although the business is 
supposedly 0弔問izedon the rationale of profit maxirnization， various farnily ti巴scould possibly 
lead industries into other objectives. Its巴mployeesare often drawn from a kinship circle， which is 
restricted to either one family or a kinship group. Ownership and management are transferr巴ddi-
rectly to family members， especially to sons， without組 yindustrial training. Its capital is usually 
raised from family sources. lts purchases of inputs and sales of produce are apt to be dictat巴dby 
the effort to give preference to family claims. Therefore， the formal rules and 0句ectivesof the irト
dustries are largely a facade; the actual operations are based on a blueprint of kinship ties. Thus， 
these kinship relationships have seriously affected the development of industries in Sri Lanka. 
Another m可orfeature of Sri La此ansociety is the discrimination against women. This is ap-
par巴ntin the Gender均relatedDevelopm巴ntInd巴x(GDI)， where Sri Lanka ranks 80 out of 144 
countries (World Bank， 2002). Traditionally women are not permit除dto engage in economic 
roles in Sri Lanka. Only a tiny rninority receives an advanced education thus proceeding into 
higher occupations. This means Sri Lanka stil has not received the ful contribution of its women. 
Female subordination has been a n巴arlyuniversal phenomenon in most Asian countries. Although 
Japan and Rep‘of Korea now rank 13 and 30 respectively in the GDI ranking， they were町田ル
tialy male dorninant societies in the past. However， they have used this cultural factor to uplift 
the productivity of the industries. For example， an average Japanes巴ora Korean male巴mployee
would hav巴astronger bond to his workplace rather than to his family. There is a saying in East 
Asian cultures such as Japan， China， and S. Korea that‘people get married to their organization'. 
The husbands have been released from most of the family duties such as childcar巴andhousehold 
work， and social obligations， thus they have mor，巴timeto spend at th巴irworkplace. This is an ex-
ample where a negative cultural factor has been effectively utilized to develop th巴industrialsec-
tor in thes巴nations.Unfortunately， this pattern does not exist in Sri Lanka， thus gender discrimi-
nation has seriously af，巴ctedits industrialization process. 
From the feudal system (until 1505) and until the later pぽtof the British colonial period 
(1796 to 1948) Sri Lanka was (and occasionally the rural areas stil are) characterized by a two田
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Table 2: Comparison of Social Organization in the Three Nations 
Social Organization Sri Lanka Rep.of Japan 
Korea 
Kinship Relationships ' 2.5 3.0 4.0 
Gender Inequality 
-G巴nderr巴lateddev巴lopmentindex H [Rank] 2001 0.726 [80] 0.873 [30] 0.926 [13] 
Gender empowerm巴ntmeasure [Rank]2001 0.272 [67] 0.363 [63] 0.515 [44] 
-Female legis1ators， senor ofticials， and managers 
4 5 9 
トー (% of total) 
-Female professional and t巴chnicalworkers (% oftotal) 49 34 45 
Female education 
*Adult female literacy rate (as % ofmal巴rate)2001 94 97 
卜一一一一
* Average years of schooling -F巴male1 Male 6.617.2 10.0/11.7 9.1/9.9 
同 Femalein economic activity 
*Female economic activity rate -age 15 & abov巴2001 43.1 53.6 50.9 
*Estimated earned income (US$) 2001 2，0951 9，5291 15，6171 
Female / Male 4，189 20，578 35，061 
ネFemalein labor force (%) 2000 36.6 41.4 41.4 
*Female unemployment (% in femal巴laborforc巴)
11.0 5.1 4.5 
1998-2000 
Indigenous Middle Class 
巴 Presence01 indigenous middle class' 3幽O 3.5 4.0 
。laborforce engage in middle class occupations (%)" 3.0 4.0 4.0 
Extent of Social Mobility 
-Extent 01 oppo吋unities10 advance inlo middle class occupa蜘
3.0 4.0 4.0 
lions' 
-Presence 01 prohibitive cultural barriers 10 upward social mo-
2.0 4.0 4.0 
bilily" 
Note 
， 1.Predominantly tribal groups 2. Predominantly extended lamilies with important tribal groups 3. Predominantly nuclear 
families with important extended lamilies 4. Predominantly nuclear lamilies 
H Gender頃relatedDevelopment Index: A composite index measuring three basic dimensions -life expectancy， education， 
andi恥 ome-aのustedto account for inequalities between meu and women 
福 1.Indigenous middle class is extremely small or negligible and there is no important expatriate middle class 2. Middle 
class is dominat白dby expatriate elements with small indigenous middle class 3. An impoはantindigenous middle class 4同A
predominant indigenous middle class 
" Middle class occupations -AI employment in commerce， banking， insurance， orin technical， prolessional， managerial， 
administrative， orclerical sectors. 1. <10% 2. 10-19% 3. 20-39% 4‘>39% 
， 1.Very limited access 2. Limited opportunities 3. Fairly good opportunities 4. Good opportunities 
机 1.Prohibitive cultural barriers affects majority 01 the population 2掃 Prohibitivecultural barriers allect signilicant segments 
01 the population 3. Prohibitive cultural barriers aflect small segments 01 the population 4. Absence 01 prohibitive cultural 
barriers 
Source: The World Bank， UNDP， ADB， countJy studies， and interviews. 
class structure of landlords and peasants. This structure transforrned into a new form having a 
three-class structure comprising upper， middle， and lower class巴S.Unlike the other two countries 
with a prominent middle c1ass， the majority of the population in Sri Lanka belongs to low巴ror 
poor class， the underprivileged society that has forrned by the urban workers， the estat巴wor・kers，
and the peasants with more or less similar status. Upper class people， who are few in numbers， 
achieved their elit巴 statusthrough th巴irinvolvement in economic activities and educational 
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achievements in th巴Englishlanguage during British rule. Then the middle class was formed 
wh巴nthe natives could e訂nwealth through trade and commerc巴activitiesduring the later part of 
the colonial period， but they are stil not prominent in number. Further， this middle class group， in
most cases， have received their education abroad. It is assumed that these specialists who have 
studied abroad furnish corps of middl巴mentrained in both cultures who can act as a link between 
their countries and the industrializ巴dnations. How巴ver，often such specialists are unable to make 
this type of adjustment and become museum like custodians of組問oticforeign culture rather 
than active catalysts in a developing society. In other cases， they feel completely unable to return 
to their homeland， and so become a p品rtof the“brain drain" which siphons off the world's best由
prepar巴dtalent to the countries where such talent is already in greatest supply. Their educational 
exp巴rienceabroad has been a process of cultural chang巴， which has destroyed their roots in their 
native country and made it difficult， ifnot impossible， for them to return to a constructive career. 
Th巴refore，in Sri Lanka the middle clぉshas not been an effective force driving the country toゃ
wards industrialization. 
Another distinguishable variation in the three nations is the extent of social mobility. In con-
旬、astto other two countries， there ar，巴manyprohibitive cultural barriers to upward social mobility 
in Sri Lanka including the values and norms attached to class， gendeにcaste，and religion (This 
will be analyzed in detail under cultural homogeneity and social tension). This is also affect巴dby 
lack of opportunity to obtain advance skils and education. As in Table 3， inSri Lanka， incontrast 
to the other two nations only 71 percent have enrolled in secondary education (This will be fur-
ther discussed under education in the n巴xtsection). Thus， this narrow educational base has also 
b紅Ticadedthe individual scope of improvements in status. 
ii) Education: 
Sri Lanka is an exceptional country in the world， inthat it provides free education until uni“ 
versity graduation. Sri Lanka's prim紅yenrollment rate and adult lit巴racyrate is 100 percent and 
92 percent respectively， comparing favorably with most Asian countries. Nevertheless， the ex-
pected relationship between education and industrialization has not been observed. Hilda 
Golden's (1955: 14) analysis rev巴alsthat the degree of literacy can b巴associatedwith retarded in-
dustrialization in some countries. Golden explained it as perhaps being a discrepancy between the 
census definition of lit巴racyand the real m巴aningof literacy. In the formal definition， itis the 
mere ability to write one's name and read a simple article， but whether th巴peasantis really able 
to participate in a modern communication system is questionable. 
Sri Lanka is desp巴ratelyshort of most of specialists， which require advanced educational 
preparation. Looking further， one finds巴vengreater shortage of technicians or technically literate 
people who have received the type of training that can be given in vocational training centers. 
Without a sound educational system， which provides the essentials of scientific knowledg巴， skills， 
and attitudes， Sri Lanka is hopelessly handicapped in the assimilation of new technologies. One 
obvious reason for the limited supply of trained specialists is a shortag巴ofsecondary schools¥ 
vocational training institutes， and univ巴rsitieswith adequate facilities. A significant number of 
6 In 2000， only 575 government schools out of total9，976 schools (5.8 P巴rcent)had Advanced Level (High 
School) sci巴ncec1asses (http://www.statistics.gov.lk/abs位act/education/tab2108.pd。
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Table 3: Comparison of Educational System in the Three Nations 
Educatiollal System Sri Lanka Rep.of Japan Korea 
Primary Education 
-N巴tprimary enrollm巴ntratio (%) 1998 100.0 . 100.0 
山 Proportioncomp1ete primarγschoo1 (%) 1992-2C泊。 100.0 96.0 
Adu1t Literacy Rate (% age 15 and above) 2001 91.9 97.9 コ99.0
-Ma1巴/Fema1e iliteracy rate 2000 6.0111.0 1.0/4.0 
Gーrosssecondary巴nrollmentratio (% of relevant age 71.0/55.0 ./78.0 102.0/93.0 group) 199811980 
-Gross tertiary enrollm巴ntratio (% of re1evant ag巴group) 3.0 15.0 44 (1998) 1980 
Science and Technology Education 
叩 Scientistsand engineers in R&D (per million people) 191 2，319 5095 1996四2000
Tーechnicianin R&D (per million people) 1990-2000 45.0 574.0 663.0 
-Science， mathematics and engineering students (as % of 29 34 23 al tertiary students) 1994-1997 
-Science and technical journal articles (No.) 1997 61 4，619 43.891 
Graduate Employment 
-Unemployment with tertiary巴ducation(% of total unem- 50.2 20.0 25‘6 ploym四 t)1997-1999 
Source: The World Bank， UNDP， and ADB 
people discontinue their education at secondary schoollevel or before (i.e. at the age of 10 years). 
The competition at s巴condaryeducation is so vast that only 2 to 3 percent get a chance to enter 
th巴only13 universities， that are al under government control. The technical colleg巴sare also few 
in number (only 36 colleges in 2000) and training in these institutes is sometimes stigmatized by 
cultural ideologies (e.g. caste system， class and status，巴tc.).In the British period， the school cuト
riculum was aimed at imparting a sound classical and liberal arts巴ducation.Since scientific and 
technical manpower is in short supply， one might巴xpectthat the major focus of high巴reducation 
have been in this direction after independence. The t巴ndencyhowever， isto maintain a liberal arts 
curriculum， even though there is hardly any demand for such personnel. 
The schools have failed to produce a‘functionally' educati巴dpopulation， a fairly adequate 
supply of technicians， and a considerable number of highly trained men who ar巴 activein re-
search activities， prepared to take initiativ邸 andrisks that lead to industrialization. This has led 
Sri Lanka to be paradoxically characterized by a considerable number of unemployed univ巴rsity
graduates coupled with a shortag巴ofvarious types of skilled manpow巴r.Graduates， inste丘dofbe-
coming a dynamic element in the country's progress， simply d巴velopinto “intellectual puppets" 
and complain that the society is unable to provide a function that grant them status and privilege. 
On the other hand industrialists claim that the‘educated people'， especially university graduates， 
are incapable of doing any innovative work， and become nuisances in their organizations. 
iv) Mass Communication: 
As already discussed， mass media helps to educate and to mod巴mizethe thought pattems of 
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a society. In turn， ithelps to increase the demand for commodities produced by industries， a nec回
目 saryfactor for industrial development. By eliminating traditional and often antagonistic ideolo-
gies， mass media c組 alsohelp creating a modern society with bett巴rsocial and political integra同
tion. However， ithas been observed that both the number組 dquality of mass media in Sri Lanka 
is very low compared to the other two countries. The country comp訂isonin Table 4 shows a great 
variation in the use of al mass media techniques including newspapers， radio， and television. 
Table 4: Comparison of Mass Communication in the Three Nations 
Mass Communication Sri Lanka Rep.of Japan 
Kor巴a
-Daily N巴wspapers(per 1000 people) 1998 29 393 578 
-Radio (per 1000 people) 2000 208 1，033 956 
回 Televisionsets (per 1000 people) 2000 111 364 725 
-Television cable subscribers (per 1∞o people) 2000 0.3 177.4 147.4 
Source: The World Bank 
One can argue that th巴useof mass media increases with th巴economicdevelopment of a na-
tion. However， it1S only one factor. There are other socio-cultural factors attached to the develop-
ment of mass communication of a nation. On the :first hand mass media should have a demand， 
which will be determined by， for instance， the newspapers， the r巴adingbehavior of the society 
from the demand side and the quality of informat10n publish巴din the newspap巴rsfrom the supply 
side. With r巴spectto the quality of information， some hav巴notedthat in Sri Lanka， especially 
gov巴rnmentowned and controlled radio， television， and print media that have the broad巴stout個
reach in terms of distribution networks， are presenting bogus information that cannot be trusted7 • 
For instance， as Deshapriya (2002) pointed out， since independence， succ巴ssivegovernments in 
Sri Lanka have put into place a numb巴rof laws and regulations that empower state authorities to 
impose constraints on the freedom of巴xpressionand information. The government on the other 
hand blames the private media for presenting misleading information. This has led to social and 
political instability in Sri Lanka， which has negatively affected industrialization. Disanayaka 
(2002) pointed out that the Sri Lankan media at times has contributed to the escalation of ethnic 
tensions and political instability in the island. 
v) Fertili.砂Rate:
The importance of a low rate of fertility was already discussed in the foregoing analysis. 
Since independence， Sri Lanka has experienced signi:ficant ch加 gesin the level of fertility. The 
total fertility rate has declined from about :fiv巴childrenper woman in the early 1960s to near the 
r巴placem巴ntlevel of 2.1 by the year 2000， i泊ns叩pit旬eoぱfthe fact t白ha瓜tthe numb 巴αroぱfwom巴叩nin t白h巴r児e蝋
productive age group has morl陀ethan double巴ddur双ingthe s凶am巴p巴I丘iod(Dept. of Census and Statis山
tics). Although Sri Lanka's fertility rate does not match Rep. of Korea and Japan， itis one of the 
b巴stamong other developing nations. The establishment of the Family Health Bureau in 1965 to 
implement a national family planning program， a network of family planning clinics through out 
7 Ther巴areonly seven large private establishments publishing daily newspapers， and few other priv丘te巴stab-
lishments publishing weekend newspap巴rs.Th巴numberof privately own巴destablishments broadcasting on ra-
dio and t巴levisionis only tbr巴e.
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the country， and a contraceptive service hav，巴beenthe major programm巴dfactors behind this fer-
tility decline. Among the non-programmed factors， the initial impetus for fertility dec1ine has 
come about through socio-cu1tural factors. Although Sri Lankan standards， asdiscussed under 
‘social organizationにarefar below that of industrialized countries， th巴yhave shown some im時
provement in expansion of educational and occupational opportunities hence upward social mo鳴
bility for women in the r配 entcouple of decades. This has lifted the age at marriage of females 
and consequently reduced the rat巴offertility in Sri Lanka. 
Table 5: Comparison of Fertility Rate of the Three Nations 
Fertility Rate 
-Total Ferti!i ty Rate (births p巴rwoman) 2000 
Source: The World Bank 
vi) Cultural Homogeneity and Social Tension: 
Sri Lanka is characterized by many culturally diverse communities influenced by both east-
em and western cu1tur巴s.Even today， these diff，巴rentcommunities maintain a strong bond to their 
original cultures with traditional beliefs and customs. These traditional values， norms， and cus“ 
toms， which are antagonistic in nature， have resu1ted in prolonged conflicts among those commu-
nities. Th巴ensuingsocioべ:u1turalaspects have inevitably contributed to Sri Lanka m巴etingwith 
litle succ巴s初出variousattempts to develop the industrial sector. 
Among the socio市culturalendowments， itmay not be incorrect to state that，the factor， which 
has most seriously affected Sri Lanka's industrialization is cultural heterogeneity and related vio同
lence. In Sri Lanka there are three main ethnic communiti巴s，namely Sinhala (74 percent)， Tamil 
(18 percent)， and Muslim (6.5 percent). The primordial attachments to their original ethnic beliefs 
and customs t巴ndto be very strong among the three communities. Consequently， there are distinct 
cultural， religious， linguistic， and regional differences among them. The antagonistic perceptions 
created by these differences have resulted in racial conflicts in areas such as the relative socio-
economic position in society， religious， language， and education rights， employment opportunities 
and the ownership of wealth int巴rruptingthe mutual harmony and complementary relationship 
among them (Nanayakkara， 1999). The marked ethnic violence and resultant risk has adversely 
affected investment activities of both local and intemational communities. In contrast， Korean and 
Jap組 esesocieties are relatively homogeneous. Although there are minority communities， namely 
ethnic Chinese in South Korea， and Ainu (く20，000peopl巴)and Okinawian (Ryukuyαn) in Japan， 
they are small in numbers and their cultural ideologies ar巴notso different， preventing ethnicity 
relat吋 violencein those two countries. 
Another area where conflicts have occurred is through religious diff，巴rences.Religious divi制
sion in Sri Lanka is linked to ethnic affiliation， thus making a double barrier， which is far合om
easy to bridg巴.In Sri Lanka there are four main religious groups， namely Buddhists (69.3 peト
cent)， Hindu (15.5 percent)， Christians (7.6 percent)， and Muslims (7.5 percent). Under colonial-
ism， al indigenous religions (i.e. Buddhism， Hinduism， and Islam) found themselves placed in 
the classification of somewhat dubious religious institutions. On the contr紅y，varying degrees of 
preference were granted to Christianity as the religion embodying th巴valuesystem of the con-
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queror. The British also support巴dreligious competition in Sri Lanka so long as it was not se巴nto 
result in加 encouragementof nationalistic activities. Cons巴quently，various religious disput巴soc-
C町四din the island， for instance the late-nineteenth-century riot betwe巴nBuddhists叩 dChris同
tians， and the clashes pitted between Sinhal巴seagainst Muslims in 1915 (Pfaffenberger， 1992). 
These religious conflicts continued and even today， Sri Lanka is characteriz巴dby religious vio愉
lence that has advers巴lyaffected the industrialization process. Although Japan and Korea are also 
characterized with multi-r己ligiouscommunities8， th巴primordialattachments to differ巴ntreligious 
beliefs and customs ar巴relativelyless， thus the chances for violence are also les. Although indi輸
viduals in these societies are attached to different religions by birth， inreality often th巴yhold and 
practice rather a mix巴dversion of different r，巴ligions9 •
Sri Lanka is also characterized by a three四classstructure comprising upp民 middle，組d
lower classes. The formation and oth巴rdetails of the class structure were already discuss巴:dunder 
'social organization'. Their incom巴， property， type of clothing， level and kind of education， lan-
guage of communication and patterns of social etiquette observed are markedly different from 
巴achother. Since classes represent conflicting interests， the relationships b巴tweenthem are funda-
mentally antagonistic in nature. The preconditions of industrialization such as challenging the 
status quo， seeking new routes for social mobility， taking risks， etc.， occur in situations with such 
antagonistic perceptions. However， inSri Lanka formulation of a new idea from a member be-
longing to lower and middle classes has be巴nconsidered as a threat to society. Often such initia-
tives have result巴din sever corporaJ punishment叩.Thus， the common practice of the lower classes 
is principally accepting the system of inequality， believing that they are not perpetual losers or 
that their position is improving. Members of the upper class are equally held back because their 
prerogatives are based upon th巴traditionalprestige system and a challenge to any aspect of that 
system may call into question their very status， which gives them importanc巴.Although， th巴pres-
巴nceof rich and poor is a universal phenomenon， inKorea and Japan the societies are not strati回
fied into upper， middle， and lower classes and even within the rich and poor the economic， politi-
cal， and social disparity is not so different. 
Language differences have also caused another area of dispute among the Sri Lankan society. 
During the colonial era， both Sinhala and Tamillanguages were spoken， but the main medium of 
education and government and therefore， the path to social mobility was English， the language of 
the Europ巴anpower. Recently al three languages were made 0出cial.狂owever，Sri Lanka has 
found it di部cultto displace English as the language of the universities and commerce. The lan-
guage disparity has bottl巴neck，巴dth巴communicationprocesses. 1n a situation where Sinhalese 
speak Sinhala， the rest speak Tarnil， while only a few can communicat巴inEnglish"， an effective 
8 In J apan ther巴arefive religions namely Shinto (nearly 95 million畑769も);Buddhism (24 million in Nichiren 
sect) (Out of the total poplllation， 84% believe both Shinto and Buddhism); Confucianism; Daoism; ChIistian-
ity (1 million people -0.7%). In Korea there are thr巴ereligions na:mely Buddhism， Confucianism; and ChIisti司
anity nearly on巴thirdof poplllation atach巴dto each of th巴religion
9 For instance， an averag巴Japanesewil go to Shinto shrine for their day to day prayers， Chllrch for his/h巴r
wedding ceremony， and Buddhist t巴mpl巴ifsomeone passed away. 
10 For example， the initiatives of the NP -Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna -members wer巴ruthlesslycrushed tak-
ing thousands of lives， mostly b巴longto underprivileged middle and lower clas society in Sri Lanka 
1 According to Halpe， a professor in English， inSIi Lanka only about three p巴rcentof the population is fluent 
in English langllage 
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Table 6: Cultural Homogeneity and Social Tension' in the Three Nations 
Cultural Homogenei.砂andSocial Tension Sri Lanka Rep.of 
Korea 
EthniclRacial Relationship 
ーNumberof巴thnicgroups 3+1 1+1 
-Popu1ation in the dominant ethnic group (%) 74 ご 100
-Social instability arose from ethnic tension ' 4.0 1.0 
-Marketed ethnic violence ' 4.0 1.0 
Religious Relationship 
-Numb巴rof re1igious groups 4 3 
-Population in the dominant religious group (%) 69.3 こ35.0
開 Socialinstability arose from religious tension i 4.0 1陶O
峨 Marketedreligious violence' 3.0 1.0 
Class and Status Relationship 
凶 Numberof class and status groups 3 
-Population in the dominant class (%) 
献 Socialinstability arose from class related tension i 4.0 
ωMarketed class related violence i 3.0 
Language Relationship 
ーNumberof officiallanguages in use 3 1 
守 Populationspeaking th巴dominantlanguage (%) ""80 100 
-Social instability arose from language related tension i 4.0 2.0 
-Marketed language related violence ' 2.0 1.0 
Caste Relationship 
明 Numb巴rof castes 12+6 。
町 Populationin the dominant caste (%) こ50 。
-Social instability arose from caste related tension i 3.0 1.0 
-Marketed caste related violence ' 1.0 1.0 
Note 
， -In the past 50 years 
， 1.Never occurred (0) 2“Rarely occurred (1-3) 3. Somewhat occurred (4-10) 4. Frequently occurred (>10) 
Source: Country studies and interviews 
Japan 
1+2 
""1α) 
1.。
1.0 
4+1 
ご 84.0
1.0 
1.0 
100 
2.0 
1.0 
1+1 
::98 
1.0 
1.0 
communication process cannot be expected. The language differences have also adversely coか
tributed to worsening the conflict between Sinhala and T;昌milcommuniti巴s.Sri Lanka was 
granted independence in 1948 and since th巴nthe country was governed for eight years by an os-
tensibly panethnic national party of unity， but in 1956 a Sinhalese populist politici組 wona lanι 
slide victory on a platform to mak巳Sinhalathe sole official language of government affairs. Ten-
sions rose as Tamils resisted this move， and the first communal riots in the 20th century occurred 
in 1 958 (Pfaffenb巴rger，1992). 
In Sri Lanka， the Sinhala and Tamil communities are also stratified according to castes， 
which remains hereditary from generation to generation. They are associated with issues of social 
hierarchy and institutionalized inequality. A caste can be defined as“… a birth ascribed 
endogamous subdivision of an ethnic unit occupying a position of sup巴rioror inferior rank" 
(Nanayakkara， 1999). Membership of a particular caste is associated with a distinct cultural heri糊
tage， ideology， and set of ritual practices， which determine many behaviors， expectations，組dob-
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ligations for individuals. According to Ryan (1993: 93)， there are 25 castes with distinct occupル
tions and 12 sub伽casteswithin the Sinhala community. These castes and sub-castes ar巴hierarchi制
cally arranged， Goyigama (farm巴rs)at the top and Rodi (beggars) at the bottom12• Th巴1・巴strictions
on interaction among the members of different castes advers巴lyaffect the processes of effective 
communication， and complement訂yrelationships among the members of soci巴ty.In addition the 
skil based hierarchical stratification of the Sri Lankan caste system， has led to the stigmatizing of 
most industries and the individuals associated with them. Japan was also charact巴rizedwith a four 
-caste structure13 in the Edo period (from 1603 to 1867)， when there were about 2 to 3 perc巴ntof 
hisabetsu buraku people (discriminated communities -butchers， leatherworkers， and certain en国
tertainers). With the Meji r巴storation(from 1868国1912)，steps were taken to discontinue this caste 
system and as a result， today this institution is an abandoned social phenomenon. 
Thel拙 pactof Socio-culture Factors on Industrialization， Agricultural Development 
and Economic Growth 
The inter剛countrycomparison showed a significant variation in the socio田culturalendow-
ments of the three natIons. The impact of thes巴socio麟culturalvariations is straightforward. There 
were marked differences in industrial and agricultural development， and consequently on the 
overall economic progr巴sof the respective nations (Table 7). In the industrial and agricultural 
sectors， among other indicators， the most significant variation is seen in the level of productivity 
of the three nations (Figure 1). The level of industrial productivity in Rep. of Korea and Japan is 
respectively 12 tImes and 27 tImes higher compar巴dto that of Sri Lanka. Similarly， level of agri-
cultural productivity in Rep. of Korea and Japan is respectively 16 times and 40 tim巴shigher 
compared to that of Sri Lanka. 
Consequently， there is a great variation in overall economic development of the three nations. 
At the time of independence in 1948， Sri Lanka enjoyed the third highest per capita income in 
Asia after Japan and Malaysia (Rajapatirana， 2000: 245). Even in 1960， Sri Lanka was a rela悼
tively rich Asian country with a p巴rc丘pitaincom巴ofUS$ 152， twice that of lndia (US$ 68)， 
high巴rthan Thailand (US$ 97)， and about equal to South Korea (US$ 154) (R吋apatirana，2002: 
247). Nevertheless， atpresent the per capita income in South Korea and Japan is respectively 10 
times and 42 times higher th組 thatof Sri Lanka， indicating its mediocre development in recent 
years. Ther巴fore，the socio-cultural factors， especially after independence， have created serious 
damage that has slowed down the industrialization， agricultural development and therefore the 
economic progress of Sri Lanka. 
12 According to Ryan (1993) the approximate ord巴rof major castes is Farmers; Fishermen; Cinnamon pωlers; 
Toddy tappers; Artisans， including smiths of al types; Tailors; Lime bumers; Washers; Jaggory makers; Pot-
ters; Barbers; Tom-tom beaters; Dancers; Mat weavers;“Outcastes"ーbeggars
13 In the Edo period， the society was clasified into worriers (Samurai)， farmers， industrial craftsman， and mer悶
chant in a hierarchical order below， which the outcaste community (hisabetsu buraku people) rank巴d.
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Table 7: Some Selected Indicators of Industrial， Agricultural and Economic Development 
lndicator Sli Lanka Rep.of Japan 
Korea 
Manufacturing lndustry 
S巴ctoralShar巴ofGDP (%) 2000 16目8 43.0 22.0 
Growth in Manufacturing Sector 199ふ2000 8目l 7.5 0.5 
Level of Modemization of Industry 
駒 Thestate of domestic manufacturing systems i 3.0 3.5 4.0 
輸 Diversityand range of goods produced in modern industrial 
2.5 4.0 4.0 
sector" 
Agriculture 
Sectora1 Share of GDP (%) 2000 19.4 5.0 1.0 
Growth in Aglicultural Sector 1990-2000 1.9 2 -3.2 
Crop productivity Paddy (kg/ha) 2000 3，437 6，644 6，702 
-Maize (kg/ha) 2000 1，084 4，062 2，466 
Use of Agricultural Machinery 
-Tractors (per 1，000 aglicultural workers) 1997-1999 2 60 690 
-Tractors (per 100 sq.km. 01' arable land) 1997-1999 84 908 4，675 
Use ofCh巴micalF巴rtilizer(kg/ha of aglic. land) 2000 105.1 397.0 277.4 
Economic growth: GNP per capita (US$) -1953 119 10 218 
ー1970 172 261 1903 
Note: 
， 1.Handicraft industry!Traditional production systems 2. Domestic small-scale power driven factory systems and a few 
modern factories， which are loreign linanced and managed 3. Some large-scale domestic power-driven factory systems， 
but small-scale/traditional industry is more prominent 4刷Severaldomestic factories in most industries in which most mod-
ern production methods are applied 
" 1. Domestic consumer goods and a limited number 01 export goods 2. A lair variety 01 consumer and export goods and 
some intermediate goods 3. A variety 01 consumer， export and intermediate goods and some linished goods 4. A wide vari-
ety 01 consumer， export， intermediate and linished goods 
Source: The World Bank， ADB， FAO， country studies， and expert interviews 
Figure 1: Industrial， Agricultural， and Economic Development of the Three Nations (2000) 
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Note‘Productivity in valu巴added(US$) per worker per year; Ind日stry(1995叫1999);Agricultur巴(1998-2000)
Source: The World Bank 
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Condusion 
The inter-country comparison showed a significant variation in the socio四culturalendow-
ments of the nations. Among others， the size of th巴agriculωralsector， extent of urbanization， 
genderin巴quality，巴ducationalorientation towards science and technology， mass communication， 
and on top of al， the cultural heterogeneity and related violence， which have both direct組 dindi-
rect influ巴nceson th巴industrializationprocess， were significantly different among the three na-
tions. The impact of these socio-cultural variations was also straightforward. There were marked 
differences in the industrial and agricultural productivity and development， consequently in the 
economic development of the respective nations. This explains why Sri Lanka lagged behind in 
the industrialization proc巴scompared to NIEs lik，巴 Singapor巴， South Korea， and Taiwan that had 
less per capita income in the 1950s. 
Therefore， there is an urgent need to re田constructthe socio-cultural endowments of Sri 
Lanka， ifit wishes to realize faster development of the industrial sector， and thereby the agricul-
tural s巴ctor80 that overall economic development could be achieved. Nevertheless， there are 
many， even among eminent scientists， who have difficulty in understanding the importanc巴of
socio-cultural endowments and their relationships with industlialization. One frequently asked 
question is; which comes first， the economic factors or the socio-cultural factors? Many believe it 
is economic progress that leads to change most of the socio-cultura1 variables of a nation. If that 
is so， how can one explain the economic d巴velopmentof most of th巴AsianNIEs today， which 
had worse economic standards than Sri Lanka until the 1960s. 
With time， of course， some of th巴sesocio-cultura1 aspects will chang巴naturallyalong with 
economic， political， and technological progress. Some of them are relatively stable and p巴rmanent
in nature， thus they need years or generations to change. However， others can be changed favor-
ably in a relatively shorter period of time with the prop巴rguidance and socialization of the influ-
ential groups of society such as parents， religious groups，巴ducationists，politicians， and managers. 
In order to become an industrial society and to foster industrialization， society itself should take 
the initiative and should change the attitudes and behavioral pattems of the people involved. They 
must adopt their practices to the changing expectations of soci巴tyin which they operate. For in-
stance， the four cast巴structure，which was there in Japan's Edo era had been discontinued dming 
the M吋irestoration providing egalitarian treatment to a11 the individuals in the society. Using 
such expeliences of the industrialized nations， Sri Lankan society has to adapt to the needs of the 
present world. 
In sum， this study made it clear how socio-cultural variables act as dominant factors in de-
velopment of domestic industries in Sri Lanka. This study also re-iterates the need for incorporat目
ing th巴non-economlcasp巴ctsof a nation， which affect growth叩 ddevelopment of industrial and 
agricultural sectors of the economy， rather than trying to use research paradigms 合omn紅TOW
academic discussion. The authors hope that this study provides useful references for interested 
parties and prompts further research in the understanding of domestic industries and agricultural 
development in less industrialized nations. 
90 Bull. Fac. Agr.， Saga Univ. No. 89 (2∞4) 
References 
Adelman， I. and Morris， c.T. (1971)“Society， Politics and Economic Development: A Qu副ltitativeApproach"， The Johns 
Hopkins Press， USA 
Asian Development Bank (2001)“Asian Development Outlook 2α)1"， Oxford University Press Inc.， USA 
Asian Development Bank (2001)“Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific CountriesぺOxfordUniversity Press 
Inc.， USA 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka (1998)“Economic Progress of Independent Sri Lanね"，Central Bank of Sri Lanka， Colombo 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka (2002)“'Annual Report同 2001ヲ" and other vmious issues， Centra1 Bank of Sri Lanka， Colombo 
Dept. of Census and Statistics，“Annua1 Survey of Industries"同 variousissues， Dept. of Census and Statistics， Colombo 
De Silva， S.， Ratnay必ce，P. and Takeda， J.(2002)“The Trend of the Trade Relationship between Sri Lanka and Japan in 
the Post Wor1d War I Period"， SagαUniversity Economic Review， Vo1.35， No.4， pp.15町62
Fei， J.C. H. and Ranis， G. (1964)“Development of the Labor Surplus Economy"， Richar吐D.Irwin， USA 
Golden， H.H. (1955)“Literacy and Social Change in Underdeveloped Countries"， Rural Sociology， Vol. 20， M紅ch，1955，
pp.l4 (as quoted in Hunt， 1966) 
Hay剖ni，Y. and Ruttan， v.w. (1991)“Agricultural Development: An Intemationa1 Perspective"， The Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press， USA 
Higgins， B.(1959)“Economic Development"， W川正 No抗on& Co.， New York 
Hoselitz， B.F. (1952)“Non-economic Barriers to Economic Development"， Economic Development and Cultural Change， 
Vol.， No.l， ppふ21
Hunt， C.L. (1966)“Social Aspects of Economic Development"， McGraw也Hill，Inc.， USA 
Lemer， D. and Pevsner， L.W. (1958)“The Passing ofTraditional Society"， The Free Press， USA 
Lewis， W.A. (1954)“Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor"， Manchester School of Economic and 
Social Studies， Vo1.22， pp.l39-191 
Na如na勾ya誌kkar瓜a払，G.(ο1999釣)
Jaye目wν叩a訂rdenepura，Colombo 
Pfaffenberger， B. (1992)“Sinhalese"， inHockings， P.(Ed) Encyclopedia ofWorld Cultures ~ゐl. II South Asia， G.K. Hal! 
& Co.， New York 
R勾apatirana，S. (2002)“Foreign Trade and Economic Development: Sri Lanka's ExperienceぺinAthukorala Prem缶
Chandra (剖)The Economic Development of South Asia，ぬlume1， Edward Elgar Publishiug Ltd.， U.K.， pp.245-259 
Russett， B.M.， etal.， (1964)“World Handbook of Political and Social IndicatorsぺYaleUniversity Press， USA 
Ryan， B. (υ1993め)
Smels問er，N.J. (1959)“Social Change in the Industrial RevolutionぺTheUniversity of Chicago Press， USA 
The United Nations Development Prograrnme (UNDP) (2002)“Human Development Report 2002"， Oxford University 
Press Inc.， USA 
The Wor1d Bank (2002)“World Development Indicators"， The World Bank， USA 
Sil刊a泌Takedaand Shiratake: Impact of Socio-cultura1 Factors on lndustnalization and Agricultura1 Developm叩tin Sri Lanka: A Comp訂ativeAna1ysisぱThr白AsianC叩H組出 91 
スリランカにおける産業化と農業発展におよぼす社会文化的要因
~アジア三宙開の比較分析~
ディスイルワサーリエ*1・武田薄氷2 白武義治*3
平成15年9月19日受理
摘要
農業を基盤にした産業の発展は， 一国の農業生産性の改善に緊急な課題である. しか
しながら，農業を基盤にした産業の発展の場合，概して当該国の経済的，技術的，制度
的および社会文化的な要因に依存していることが多い.産業化のための前三つの要閣の
重要性についてはこれまで広範囲にわたって調査されてきているが，最後のものについ
ては実証研究は皆無に近い.
そこで本研究は，産業化が進んでいないスリランカ，近年の産業化が著しい韓国と，
高度に産業化が進んだ、日本を対象に三国間の産業化におよぼす要因について比較研究を
試みたものである.産業発展におよぽす要因を明らかにするために，社会経済帯造，社
会組織，教育，マスコミニュケーション，出生率，文化的均一性，社会的緊張を含む六
つの主要な要因を比較・分析した.研究は主にワールドパンク， UNDP， FAO， ADBか
最近出版された二次的な資料に基づいている.必要に応じて，当該国の専門家とのイン
ターピューによる資キヰも加えた.
三国間での比較分析の結果，各国の社会文化的な要国に有意な変異が見られた.産業
化過程に直接，あるいは間接な影響を与える要因として農業セクターの規模，都市化の
範囲，ジェンダーによる不平等性，科学と技術の指向性，マスコミコミュニケーション，
とりわけ文化的な不均一性とそれに関わる暴力が三国間で有意に異なっていた.これら
の社会文化的な変異の要因も簡潔明瞭である.産業と農業の発展と生産に，その結果と
して，三国間の経済発展に顕著な葉があらわれた.従って，産業と農業のセクターのよ
り早い発展を促進し，それ相応の経済発展を達成するためにはスリランカの社会文化的
な要因を緊急に再構築する必要がある.
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